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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Nathan Byerly appeals from the summary dismissal 0f

his petition for post-conviction

relief.

Of The

Statement

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

December of 2005, Nathan Byerly was convicted of aggravated

In

He ﬁled

(R., pp. 5, 278-79.)

battery.1

a petition for post-conviction relief

pp. 5-57), alleging thirty—seven bases for post-conviction relief,

convictions in 2005

new trial,

20-53).

(R., pp.

alleged that he

(R., p. 6.)

He

dismissed.

(R., pp. 7-8.)

was

relief,

incarcerated between

He

relief

Little

was necessary

t0 re-enter court

0n the

and

(R., pp. 54-56.)

issues.”

parole.

STATE OF IDAHO jurisdiction,

is

is

He

(R., p. 8.)

declaration of Jubilee year

sojourning at

could afford t0 return to territory of Residency.”

However, there

district court’s

trial

(R.,

2010 while incarcerated but the appeal was

of the record from the underlying criminal case

proceedings.

addressed to his

new trial.

considered “sacred sanctuary,” the state considered a parole Violation.

1

2018

2006 and 2013, When he was granted

March of 2015, he “sought sacred sanctuary upon

until Petitioner

6,

With respect to the claims in his petition but “was restricted

Pope over one hundred miles beyond

OF UTAH

0n June

claimed that he was released 0n parole in October of 2013 and he

before being able t0 d0 what

alleged that, in

all

and aggravated

he requested a reversal of his convictions and a

alleged that he ﬁled an appeal in

began the process 0f seeking

the

As

along With other relief associated with the conduct 0f the

He

assault

He

(Id.)

by

STATE

What Byerly

alleged that he

was

in the record in the post—conviction

n0 dispute regarding the relevant dates forming the basis of the

determination that Byerly’s petition

ﬁlings below and his opening brief 0n appeal.

is

untimely. Byerly cites the dates himself in

arrested in

Utah and was incarcerated there

until

March 0f 2016,

and re-arrested 0n an Idaho warrant associated with his parole
extradited t0 Idaho in early June 0f 2016.

revoked?

(R., p. 9.)

On

at

Which point he was paroled

Violation.

return,

(R., pp. 8-9.)

He was

he alleges that his parole was

(R., pp. 10-1 1.)

After Byerly ﬁled his petition, the state

moved

for

summary

dismissal.

(Supp. R., pp.

485-86.) In support, the state submitted records associated with Byerly’s prior appeal. (Supp. R.,

pp. 487-92.)

Those records reﬂect

that, in

June 0f 2008, Byerly

unseal his PSI under I.C.R. 32, purportedly to assist

him

moved

in preparing a

the district court to

motion under I.C.R. 35.

(Supp. R., pp. 487-89.) Because a motion under I.C.R. 35(b) would have been untimely and such
a motion would therefore provide n0 reason t0 unseal the PSI, the district court provided Byerly

time t0 clarify the basis 0f his motion.
release 0f the PSI t0 help

(Id.)

him prepare

Byerly responded and “abandoned his request for

a Rule 35 motion” and instead “ask[ed] for the PSI

because he claim[ed] information contained therein has affected his custody status
correctional facility.”

(Supp. R., p. 488.)

The

district court

denied that motion.

at the

(Supp. R., pp.

488-89.) In April of 2009, Byerly then appealed the district court’s denial 0f his request t0 unseal
his PSI.3

(Supp. R., pp. 490-91.) Finally, on Byerly’s motion, the appeal was dismissed by the

Idaho Supreme Court and a remittitur issued on April 12, 2010. (Supp. R.,
In support of the

motion

to ﬁle a post-conviction petition

2

is
3

He

also claims that he

t0 dismiss the petition, the state

p. 492.)

argued that the time for Byerly

had long since expired, even 0n the counterfactual assumption

was charged and convicted of other criminal conduct, Which conviction

the subject of a separate challenge in state and federal courts. (R., pp. 10-1

1.)

After ﬁling a notice of appeal, Byerly ﬁled a motion for a permissive, interlocutory appeal

under Idaho Appellate Rule

12.

(Supp. R., pp. 490-91.)

The

district court

denied that motion

because the order denying his request t0 unseal the PSI was not an interlocutory order.

(Id.)

that the petition

was somehow addressed

denial of that motion.

t0 his

motion

to release the

PSI and the appeal from the

(Supp. R., p. 497.) The state further argued that none 0f the very limited

bases for equitable tolling 0f the time t0 ﬁle a petition applied here. (Supp. R., pp. 497-99.)

Byerly responded, arguing that his petition should be considered timely under equitable
tolling.

He

(R., p. 143.)

cited a variety of factors that, he claims, should toll the deadline to ﬁle

PSI (Supp.

his petition, including: (1) the district court’s refusal t0 unseal his

R., pp. 502-03); (2)

alleged ineffective assistance of his Idaho Appellate Public Defender in the appeal from the

denial of his request that his PSI be unsealed

While incarcerated (Supp. R.,

2013

(id.); (3)

alleged and unspeciﬁed “retaliations”

p. 504); (4) parole restrictions after

he was paroled in October of

that “chill[ed]” his ability to ﬁle a petition (Supp. R., p. 504); (5) general concerns about

the (in)effectiveness of “Idaho’s public defender system” (Supp. R., pp. 504-05); (6) a “lack of
available legal resources, materials, counsel” (Supp. R., p. 506); (7) “out of state incarceration

periods”

(id.);

(8) “interference

With access to courts of prison and retaliation”

“Golden Jubilee and extraordinaire

Though

it is

[sic]

not entirely clear,

it

rendition”

(id.);

and

(9)

(id.).

appears that Byerly believed

that,

because of his appeal

of the denial of his motion to unseal his PSI, his deadline t0 ﬁle a petition would not have begun
until a year after

he was released on parole, 0r in October of 2014.

claimed, that deadline

conditions.

state

(Id.)

was

tolled because he

arrested

“chi11[ed]”

from ﬁling a petition by

This, he claimed “again advances the date into

and incarcerated in Uta

sanctuary in Uta

was

,”

was

.”

arrested

(Id.)

He

But, he

his parole

2015 When Mr. Byerly

is

out of

claimed that after he had “taken Jubilee refuge in

and then released from prison

on an Idaho warrant and returned

(Supp. R., 507.)

to Idaho “about

in

Utah

June 09, 2016,

date to June 2017.” (Supp. R., p. 508.) Finally, back in Idaho, he

is tried

in 2016,

this

and then

re-

advances the ﬁling

on new felony charges

that are not resolved until

2018.”

(Id.)

2017, which “advances the ﬁling deadline t0 about

May

24,

So, Byerly claimed, his petition should be considered timely.

Byerly
(R., pp.

May 24,

later

144-49,

ﬁled various addenda to his petition and opposition to summary dismissal.
In his addenda t0 his petition, he purported t0 assert

150-237, 238-57.)

additional claims for post-conviction relief, including a request for forensic testing of certain

evidence (R., pp. 144-49) and an allegation that the state failed to comply With the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers while he was incarcerated

summary

to his opposition to

impropriety 0f

summary

Utah

in

dismissal, he reiterated

(R., pp. 238-57.)

dismissal.

(R., pp. 150-237).

many 0f his

In his

addendum

claims regarding the alleged

For the ﬁrst time, though, he alleged that

he was forcibly medicated for a period, apparently between 2006 and 2008, While incarcerated in

He

Idaho. (R., p. 247.)

also ﬁled a

“Motion

t0

Enjoin Party

As Respondent,” demanding

that the

prosecutor Withdraw from the case and issue a public apology because she stated that he was “out

of custody” While on parole, rather than on “community custody,” as Byerly stated in his
(R., pp. 258-61.)

Finally,

Appointment of Counsel

though

it

for Hearing

Hearing Judicial Notice to Confer”

does not appear in the record, he ﬁled a “Motion for

Only and Needs of

(R., pp. 262-64),

Petition

and Petitioner’s Scheduled

Which “requests appointment of a public

defender for this hearing only since he cannot hear due t0 tinnitus disabilities and

and because he does not speak American Sign Language.”

The

district court

petition.

ADHA

[sic]

(R., p. 263.)

denied Byerly’s request for an attorney.

(Id.)

The court noted

that

Byerly did not want an attorney for purposes of representing him in the post—conviction
proceedings generally, but only t0 accommodate certain hearing difﬁculties.
declined to

appoint an attorney for that purpose alone,

accommodations

for

any hearing

issues, including, at

no cost

instead

offering

t0 Byerly, “a

(Id.)

The court

Byerly various

second court reporter

present to provide a real time reporting 0f the hearing for Petitioner t0 read on a laptop during the
hearing,” as well as “a hearing device to enhance Petitioner’s ability to hear the proceedings.”

(Id.)

In an objection t0 the court’s denial of his motion, Byerly stated that he

for the hearing because

Who

“illiterate,”

had offered

transcript the court

attorney,

he was

needed an attorney

but then also stated that he would use the real-time

to provide

and then relay statements

could then relay them t0 the court. (R., pp. 266-69.)

personally address the court only in writing.

(Id.)

The

He

to his court-appointed

also stated that he

district court later reiterated that

would
it

was

denying the request because Byerly was not requesting legal counsel, but was simply asking for

someone

t0 “act as a

mouthpiece and speak for him.”

(R., p. 284.)

the request because his post-conviction claims are “clearly barred

and so patently frivolous.

district court

by

the statute of limitations”

(Id.)

Next, the court denied Byerly’s “Motion to Enjoin Party
93.) Byerly cited Federal

In addition, the court denied

As Respondent.”

Rule of Civil Procedure 20 as a basis for the motion.

(R., pp.

290-

(R., p. 290.)

The

concluded that the federal rule had no application to the proceeding, and Idaho Rule

0f Civil Procedure 20, While applicable t0 the proceeding, did not provide a basis for the relief
requested by Byerly.

(R., pp. 290-91.)

That rule permits the joinder of a third-party as a

defendant under circumstances the court determined were not present here.

(Id.)

In addition,

though, the court determined that the prosecutor had not done anything improper in suggesting

that Byerly

was not

“in custody”

Finally, the court

When he was 0n parole.

(R., pp. 291-93.)

summarily dismissed Byerly’s petition as time-barred.

It

held

that,

taking Byerly’s claims about having been forcibly medicated until around 2008 at face value, the

deadline

tolled

by

was

tolled until then. (R., pp. 286-87.)

his appeal following his

motion

It

held that the time to ﬁle a petition was further

t0 unseal his

PSI

until a year after the remittitur

from

that appeal

further.

was

was

ﬁled, or April 12, 201

1.

(Id.)

But, the court held, the time

In particular, the court rej ected his arguments that he did not

available or

had difﬁculty securing

effective assistance

that the time for ﬁling a post-conviction petition should

from parole and was

later arrested in

was not

tolled

any

know post-conviction relief

of counsel, as well as his argument

be tolled because he decided

to

abscond

Utah. (R., pp. 287-90.) The court therefore dismissed the

petition as untimely. (R., pp. 294-95.)

The

district court

entered judgment (R., pp. 298-99) and Byerly timely ﬁled a notice 0f

appeal (R., pp. 300-06, 452-76).

ISSUES
states the issues

Byerly

0n appeal

as:

Case No. CV01-18-10455 by Petitioner
identify the cross—mistakes—negligence and issues for redress of harm caused by
the Ada County district court in conduct of that Cases; the issues, and the Relief
requested in Case N0. CRFE 2004-1058;

The Objections and records ﬁled

(1)

(2)

t0

in

The threshold issue on appeal i am raising is that the Ada County Court erred
Summarily Dismiss the Petition for Post Conviction Relief in Case No. CV01-

18-10455; the court failed to account for proceedings ongoing in the Case N0.

CRFE

2004-1058

initiated

by

and

State 0f Idaho

factors that circumstances effecting time 0f ﬁling

(3) the

conduct 0f

Ada County Court was

that qualiﬁed

under the law and

of Petition;

prejudicial toward the Appellant, in

favor of State 0f Idaho, and contrary t0 the facts, disputed and presented at law in
the Petition to the court

by

the Appellant for

LaW-Rule-Treaty and Constitutions and
force t0 sue
against

Remedy by

Human

the court, Violating

US

Rights; Appellant has since been

Ada County and Ada County Court for more prejudicial conduct
Appellant has moved the Ada County Court must be

Appellant;

disqualiﬁed and or the court must be transferred to another county of the District
for taking

County

as

up 0f the Petition For Post Conviction Relief that was ﬁled in Ada
Case No. CV01-18-10455; Idaho Supreme Court has authority t0 order

transfer of proceedings as request;

(4)

Ada County

and the case

court err t0

shall

Case No. CV01-18-10455
another county and reinstate for conduct 0f

Summary Dismiss

be transfer t0

Petition

process thereon;
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16 (verbatim).)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Byerly established

that the district court erred in

conviction relief as untimely?

summarily dismissing

his petition for post-

ARGUMENT
Bverlv Has Failed T0

Show The

District

Court Erred

BV Summarilv Dismissing His

Petition For

Post-Conviction Relief As Untimely

A.

Introduction

The

district court

recognizing that

it

summarily dismissed Byerly’s petition for post-conviction

purported t0 state claims related t0 his

years before the petition

trial

was ﬁled and Byerly had not shown

relief after

and conviction more than twelve
that equitable tolling applied to

render the petition timely. (R., pp. 284-90, 293-95.) At the same time,

it

denied his request for a

court-appointed attorney for purposes 0f a single hearing, not to represent

him

in the post-

conviction proceeding generally, and only so that the attorney could relay to the court what

Byerly told the attorney t0 relay.

(R., pp.

262-65, 287-90.) Because the district court correctly

determined that Byerly’s post-conviction claims are clearly time-barred,

it

did not err by

dismissing his petition and denying his request for counsel.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The decision

t0 grant or

discretion 0f the district court.

(2004).

“On review of a

deny a request

Charboneau

for court-appointed counsel lies Within the

V. State,

140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111

dismissal of a post—conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court Will determine Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based

pleadings, depositions and admissions together With any afﬁdavits 0n ﬁle.”

144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb

57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002).

Workman

V. State,

0n the

V. State,

138 Idaho 76, 80,

Any Argument Regarding Error Below BV Failing T0 Include
T0 The Record, Authority, And Coherent Argument In His Opening Brief

Byerlv Waived

C.

Citations

This court should decline to consider any claims 0f error 0n appeal because Byerly has
failed to include

any

citations to the record or authority in his

coherent argument beyond conclusory claims of error.

by propositions of law,

authority, 0r argument, they Will not

Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).
authority 0r argument

“When

is

“A

issues

0n appeal

well as any

are not supported

V.

Zichko, 129

party waives an issue cited on appeal if either

appellate court Will not search the record for errors

When an

the record. State V. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159,

V.

brief, as

be considered.” State

lacking, not just if both are lacking.”

pro se and represented appellants alike. State

opening

Li.

It is

well settled that the

appellant fails to provide citations to

657 P.2d

17,

23 (1983). That rule applies to

McDay, 164 Idaho

526, 528, 432 P.3d 643, 645

(2018) (“Because [pro se appellant’s] arguments lack citations t0 the record, citations of
applicable authority, and comprehensible argument, this Court will not consider

them on

appeal.”).

Byerly’s opening brief on appeal consists entirely of factual allegations unsupported

and conclusory legal claims unsupported by any legal authority.

citations to the record

any

Though Byerly does

cite t0 the

offers t0 “describe at length”

it,”

he makes no

law,

e.g.,

effort to

by

universe 0f law applicable in Idaho and the United States, and

how

do so

these general sources of law apply here “if the court requires

in his brief.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (identifying as applicable

the “United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,” “Federal Law-Rules—Treaties of the

United States,” “State 0f Idaho law,” Title 19 0f the Idaho Code, and the United States and Idaho
constitutions).)

Because he

fails to

support his claims 0f error with citations to the record, legal

authority, or coherent argument, this

Court should decline t0 address Byerly’s claims of error

below.

Byerlv’s Post—Conviction Petition

D.

Byerly’s claims 0f error also

fail

Is

Untimely

0n the

merits.

A petition for post-conviction relief must

be ﬁled Within a year 0f the time t0 ﬁle a direct appeal 0r Within one year 0f the resolution 0f
such an appeal.

LC.

§ 19-4902(a).

The only

three circumstances in

which Idaho recognizes

equitable tolling 0f the post-conviction statute of limitations are: (1) “Where the petitioner

incarcerated in an out-of-state facility

on an

in—state conviction

was

Without legal representation 0r

access t0 Idaho legal materials,” Sayas V. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App.

2003);

(2)

“Where mental

disease

and/or

psychotropic

medication

renders

a

petitioner

incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction,” Li; and

(3)

where there are

limit, yet raise

“C

claims which simply [were] not

known

important due process issues,” Rhoades

to the defendant within the time

V. State,

148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d

1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau V. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)).
Byerly’s petition purports to state claims arising out 0f his

(R., pp. 5-57.)

trial

and conviction

For example, he alleges that his attorney did not ﬁle a motion for judgment of

acquittal (R., p. 20), there

was

error in the jury selection process (R., p. 21),

improper character evidence offered by the brother 0f Byerly’s Victim

court correctly found,

Though

“it is clear that Petitioner’s

and there was

(R., p. 23).4

convicted in 2005, Byerly ﬁled his petition for post-conviction relief in 2018.

4

in 2005.

Having been

As

the district

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief has not

the district court did not dismiss claims in Byerly’s petition

0n

this basis,

many

are (in

addition t0 being time-barred) procedurally barred as claims that could and should have been

pursued on direct appeal. LC.

§ 19-4901(b).

10

been timely ﬁled.”
(R., pp.

(R., p. 289.)

also correctly found that equitable tolling does not save

Though Byerly apparently

284-90, 294-95.)

unclear Why.

It

disagrees with the latter conclusion,

In fact, the district court applied equitable tolling far

district court

ﬁrst time in an

applied equitable tolling t0

addendum

t0 his opposition t0

forcibly medicated for a period after he

(R., p. 247.)

The

district court

was

ﬁnd two

summary

it is

more generously than was

appropriate, even if the court correctly determined that Byerly’s petition

The

it.

was untimely.

periods of tolling.

First, for the

dismissal, Byerly alleged that he

incarcerated, apparently

was

between 2006 and 2008.

accepted Byerly’s claim regarding his incapacity during this

period at face value and determined that the time to ﬁle a post-conviction claim did not begin t0

run until 2008
Second, the

from

no

district court

PSI ﬁthher

his

(R., pp. 284-86),

When Byerly

determined that Byerly’s appeal of the denial 0f his request t0 unseal

tolled the deadline to ﬁle a post-conviction claim until a year after the remittitur

that appeal issued, or April 12,

further tolling

As
ﬁnding

claims that he regained competency (R., p. 247).

was

1.

(R., pp. 286-87.)

But the court then concluded

that

appropriate. (R., pp. 286-90.)

to the period

that tolling

201

was

0f tolling associated with Byerly’s appeal, the

appropriate.

The time

district court erred in

t0 ﬁle a post-conviction petition begins after the

forty-two days to ﬁle a direct appeal from the conviction has passed, or until such an appeal

is

resolved. LC. § 19-4902(a). Thus, a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction will delay the

beginning of the period in Which to ﬁle a post-conViction petition. But,

is

it

does not follow, and

it

not true, that an appeal 0f a collateral, post-conviction order issued well after the time to ﬁle a

direct appeal has passed tolls the time t0 ﬁle a petition related to the conviction

m

and sentence.

Mills V. State, 126 Idaho 330, 333, 882 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that Where

the “application for post-conviction relief

was ﬁled more than ﬁve years

11

after expiration

of the

period for appeal from the judgment 0f conviction, [petitioner]

time-barred from obtaining

is

post-conviction relief on either the conviction or the imposition 0f sentence”); Peregrina V. State,

158 Idaho 948, 952, 354 P.3d 510, 514 (Ct. App. 2015) (“In other words, the time limit t0 ﬁle a

renewed or extended by

petition for post—conviction relief regarding prejudgment matters is not

any other

post-judgment proceeding”).

collateral

A petitioner cannot perpetually keep the time

t0 ﬁle post-conviction claims related to the conviction

frivolous appeals

appeal.

Instead,

appeal passed.

from the denial of

is

latest.

ultimately inconsequential, however, as the district court correctly concluded

that Byerly’s petition

Byerly’s appeal

collateral order long after the time to ﬁle a direct

a result, the deadline t0 ﬁle a petition for post-conviction relief related t0 his

conviction and sentence ran by 2010 at the

That error

was

somehow

still

untimely.

Even assuming

remittitur in that appeal issued

ﬁled, the judgment

appeal

is

ﬁnal,

issued.

He

rate, again,

(Supp. R., p. 492.)

at all

still

have run by April

the one-year limitation period begins to run

brief, pp. 3-4),

was denied adequate

though that

is

was appropriate through

12

When

when

the

the remittitur

legal resources

also the period during

PSI and an appeal from the denial of that motion

if tolling

12,

issues a remittitur.” (footnote omitted).)

about the one-year period following April 12, 2010,

claims, in a conclusory fashion, that he

even

would

12, 2010.

is

becomes ﬁnal and

to release his

0n April

Peregrina, 158 Idaho at 951, 354 P.3d at 513 (“If a timely direct appeal

2008 and 2010 (Appellant’s
motion

correct that

1.

Which occurs When the appellate court

Byerly says nothing

was

201

So, as the district court found, the time t0 ﬁle the petition

E

the district court

tolled the time to ﬁle a petition for post-conviction relief related to his

judgment and sentence, the

(R., pp. 286-90.)

of

series

Byerly never ﬁled a direct

collateral post—trial motions.

he ﬁled an appeal from a

As

and sentence alive by ﬁling a

between

which he ﬁled a

(R., pp. 487-92).

At any

the end 0f 2010, he says nothing about the

period between 2011 and 2013.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.)

passed before he was paroled in October of 2013.

Even
in

were wrong,

(Id.)

would have passed

it

after

he was paroled. After he was paroled

October 0f 2013, Byerly claims that the actions 0f police and parole ofﬁcers had a “chilling

effect

He

if that

Thus, the time to ﬁle his petition

and disrupt petitioners

cites

n0 authority

access to courts and civil activities.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

[sic]

for the proposition that parole conditions, allegations

and the receipt of trafﬁc

tickets,

all

0f Which Byerly complains about during

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5), could deprive

limitations for ﬁling of his petition.

post-conviction relief

was

tolled

by

(quoting

is

him of access

period

of

t0 the courts or toll the statute

his decision to

As

abscond on parole in 2015, leading

t0 his

the district court correctly held, “[a]bsconding from

not an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ tolling the statute of limitations.” (R., p. 289

Amboh

V.

State,

149 Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448, 451

appellate courts have not permitted equitable tolling

(Ct.

App. 2010) (“Idaho

where the post-conviction

petitioner’s

lack of diligence caused or contributed to the untimeliness of the petition.”)).

Byerly, he

this

Next, Byerly apparently believes that the time to ﬁle for

arrest in Utah. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

supervision

0f parole Violations,

was returned

t0

Idaho in June of 2016.

(R.,

Nevertheless, for reasons that he does not explain, his petition

Even assuming

that the time t0 ﬁle his petition

was somehow

p.

9;

According

Appellant’s brief, p.

was not ﬁled

until

own
t0

9.)

June 0f 2018.

tolled until his return t0 Idaho,

it

ran before he ﬁled his petition.

The time

to ﬁle a petition for post—conviction relief challenging his convictions

and

sentence in 2005 had long passed by the time Byerly ﬁled his petition, and none 0f the limited

circumstances providing for equitable tolling applied t0 save

dismissed the petition as untimely.
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it.

The

district court correctly

Byerlv’s Belated Attempt

E.

To

State

Claims That Were Not Time-Barred In Addenda T0

His Petition Does Not Suggest That The District Court Erred
After the state answered and

moved

for

summary

dismissal of Byerly’s petition as time-

barred, Byerly ﬁled multiple addenda t0 his petition in an apparent attempt to state claims that

were

(R., pp. 144-49, 150-61.)

not.

forensic deoxyribonucleic acid

which resulted

(DNA)

in conviction in case

In the ﬁrst, he asked for “performance 0f ﬁngerprint and

testing

No. 2004-1058.”

evidence was not “subject to the testing”

(Id.)

The other addendum alleged

Agreement on Detainers (IAD),
t0

0n evidence

at trial

that

was secured

(R., pp.

in relation to the trial

He

144-45.)

claimed that the

because his defense counsel “failed t0 so move.”

that the state failed t0 act in accordance With the Interstate

Title 19,

Chapter 50 0f the Idaho Code, when

Idaho from Utah after his parole Violation.

(R., pp.

it

sought his return

150-61 .)

Byerly’s belated attempt t0 state claims that were not time-barred

fails.

A

petitioner

cannot avoid summary dismissal 0f a petition by unilaterally, without leave of the court, ﬁling an

amended

LC.

petition.

§

19-4906(b); Cole V. State, 135 Idaho 107, 111, 15 P.3d 820, 824

The record does not reﬂect

(2000).

had already moved

for

summary

that Byerly secured leave t0

dismissal, and after he

amend his

petition after the state

had already opposed

that motion.

The

claims were therefore not before the court.
But, even if they are considered part of the petition, both claims were

still

properly

dismissed.

First,

brought

at

LC.

§

19-4902(b) provides that a petition for forensic testing of evidence

any time Where the testing did not occur

not available

at the

time of trial.” “Thus, under the

available if the requested testing relies

at trial

14

because the relevant technology “was

statute, post-conviction

0n technology

may be

that

was not

DNA testing is

only

available at the time of the

Johnson

original trial.”

asserted that the testing he

been assigned
testing

is

requesting here

t0 prepare the defense case

performed

at or

was not done “because

He

is

by the

statute

whom having

some technology was not

available.

therefore not attempting to assert a claim permitted

an ineffective assistance claim that

§ 19-4902(b), but instead is attempting to assert

other claims, barred

the attorney’s

Byerly

0f defendant petitioner failed t0 so move t0 have the

before the time of trial,” not because

144-45 (verbatim).)

(R., pp.

162 Idaho 213, 218, 395 P.3d 1246, 1251 (2017).

State,

V.

is,

by

like his

of limitations.

Second, as to the claim alleging a Violation of the IAD, based on Byerly’s
allegations, the

IAD

is

simply irrelevant. Byerly claims

detainer associated With his parole Violation

Idaho.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)

detainer”

by contacting

circumstances,

was lodged, but

He complains

(Id.)

The

Interstate

for the timely resolution

incarcerated out-of-state.

LC.

that,

probation or parole Violations.

Swain

there

though he

were n0 pending charges

in

tried to “timely resolve the

Agreement 0n Detainers provides, under

Sandy
certain

of pending criminal charges against a defendant

It

of “untried

does not apply t0 detainers associated With mere

V. State,

122 Idaho 918, 920, 841 P.2d 448, 450

(Ct.

App.

(“[T]he Interstate Agreement 0n Detainers Act does not apply t0 warrants or detainers

asserting claims 0f alleged Violation of probation”). There

respect to the IAD.

2005 convictions
With the

own

While he was arrested in Utah, a

§ 19-5001(c)(1) (requiring trial Within certain period

indictment, information or complaint”).

1992).

that,

the “State of Idaho Pardons and Parole and Executive Director

Jones,” she did not respond.

I.C.

IAD

If there

were such a claim,

it

is

no

Viable, non-frivolous claim with

would concern criminal charges other than the

that Byerly is purporting to challenge here.

In addition,

any

failure t0

comply

could and should have been pursued 0n direct appeal, for Which post—conviction

proceedings are not a substitute. LC. § 19-4901(b).
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The claims Byerly attempted

to assert in his

addenda were not properly before the

district

court and were properly dismissed even if they were.

The

F.

A

District

Court Did Not Err

BV Refusing Byerlv’s Request For Appointed Counsel

a post-conviction proceeding

petitioner in

may

request appointment of counsel

pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 19-4904. The decision t0 grant 0r deny a request for post—conviction
court—appointed counsel

(Ct.

App. 2009)

appointed
claim.”

(citing

is

Charboneau, 140 Idaho

if the petitioner

Li

at

Hust

discretionary.

V. State,

at

147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669

792, 102 P.3d at 1111). “[C]ounsel should be

qualiﬁes ﬁnancially and alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid

684, 214 P.3d at 670.

A

court

may deny

the request for counsel only if

the

all

claims in the petition are frivolous. Li.

Byerly does not claim 0n appeal that the
counsel.

He

failed t0

show

First,

district court erred

has therefore waived any such claim.
that the district court erred

by refusing

But even

if

by denying

his request for

he intended to assert

Byerly has not provided an adequate record t0 evaluate the claim on appeal. While

record and so neither

record.

he has

t0 appoint counsel.

he apparently ﬁled a motion associated with the appointment of counsel, that motion

pp. 262-65.)

it,

is

the precise nature of the request that

was denied by the

the burden 0f providing an adequate record

Court can conduct an intelligent review 0f a
804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996).

trial

court’s decision.”
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shown

(R.,

in the

0n appeal from which the

State V.

Mowrey, 128 Idaho

This Court cannot determine that the

denying a request that does not appear in the record.

not in the

district court.

“Error Will not be presumed on appeal, but must be afﬁrmatively

The appellant has

is

district erred

by

Next, as characterized by the

district court,

Byerly did not request appointment of counsel

for the post—conviction proceedings, but requested only that counsel

be provided for a single

hearing and only so that that person could relay statements to and from the court in order t0

compensate for his hearing problems.

accommodations
that

it

to help

(R., pp.

262-63, 282-84.)

with any purported hearing problems

was not appropriate

The

district court offered

(R., pp. 262-63),

to appoint counsel for a single hearing, as

but concluded

opposed

t0 the post-

conviction proceedings generally, and only so that the attorney could “act as a mouthpiece and

speak for [Byerly]”

(R., pp. 283-84).

abuse of discretion for a
legal advice

Byerly has cited no authority for the proposition that
appoint an attorney Where the request

district court t0 refuse to

and assistance

in the proceedings, but only for

is

it is

an

not for

an attorney to relay comments from

the court t0 the petitioner during a single hearing and notwithstanding the availability of

alternative

means 0f compensating

Finally,

it is

for petitioner’s hearing problems.

no abuse 0f discretion

claims are untimely and so frivolous,

M,

t0

deny a request

147 Idaho

at

for counsel

where a

petitioner’s

686, 214 P.3d at 672, as are Byerly’s

claims.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

DATED this 9th day 0f January, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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district court.
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